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  Dr. Kipnis documents and describes the decision-makers’ fatal choice to ignore global and regional changes, which led Israel to an unnecessary war and the loss of many lives. This book is an essential lesson about the heavy price of political arrogance and strategic stagnation.

  —AKIVA ELDAR

  Veteran Israeli Journalist

  Correspondent, Al-Monitor

  Yigal Kipnis knows the Yom Kippur War both as a pilot who flew helicopters in combat and, more importantly, as a scholar who dares once again to go into harm’s way. He challenges the conventional wisdom of the past forty years, which pinned most of the blame for Israel’s failure to anticipate the coordinated Egyptian-Syrian invasion on intelligence and military officers. Kipnis makes a convincing case for holding the political echelon—Prime Minister Golda Meir, Defense Minister Moshe Dayan, and a close circle of confidants—accountable for pushing Anwar Sadat into a desperate but limited military move aimed at unleashing a diplomatic process.

  Rather than realizing that by making the Nixon administration wait until after elections in Israel to launch a peace offensive, Golda and Co. should have expected war and been seriously prepared for it, they were vastly over-confident and complacent. They even kept to themselves, rather than share with their uniformed subordinates planning contingencies, secret undertakings between Washington and Jerusalem which tied Israel’s hands regarding pre-emption.

  Kipnis flies nap-of-the-earth over this complex terrain. It’s one hell of a ride for whoever is interested in how nations stumble into unnecessary wars, conduct secret diplomacy at the highest levels and watch their civil-military relations rip apart at the seams for an entire generation.

  —AMIR OREN

  Defense Correspondent, Ha’aretz

  A gripping read, taut with the tension inside Israel’s inner circle of decision- makers in the countdown to war in October 1973. Kipnis provides fascinating new details that have come to light as archives have opened up. Especially intriguing is the enigmatic role of Ashraf Marwan in the unfolding drama.

  —JANICE GROSS STEIN

  Director, Munk School of Global Affairs

  University of Toronto

  Yigal Kipnis’s 1973: The Road to War is a revelatory account of the myopic diplomacy that caused an unnecessary war. Based on extensive research in the US and Israeli archives, Kipnis shows how military overconfidence and erroneous political judgments led US and Israeli leaders to dismiss Egypt’s peace overtures and force Egypt’s Anwar Sadat to launch a war he had tried to avoid. These same errors also led Israel’s leaders to disregard the signs of imminent war in October 1973 and allowed Egypt to achieve near-complete strategic surprise. This gripping narrative will fascinate anyone interested in the history of US Middle East policy or in the long and bitter struggle between Arabs and Israelis.

  —STEPHEN WALT

  Robert and Renee Belfer Professor

  of International Affairs

  Harvard Kennedy School

  This pathbreaking work replaces the conventional military paradigm that has dominated analyses of the 1973 Yom Kippur War with a political one which is already significantly altering the narrative of the war and its aftermath. Political blinkers—supplemented by arrogance, suspicion and secretiveness—may have been the key cause of the most traumatic event in Israeli history. The possibility that this war could have been averted if Israel’s leaders had, forty years ago, agreed to pursue a diplomatic option is especially pertinent today, when mistaken preconceptions threaten to stymie the road to a just and lasting accord between Israel, the Palestinians, and the Arab world. Kipnis’s book is a must-read for anyone concerned with understanding past patterns of Israeli-Arab relations and with preventing their repetition today.

  —NAOMI CHAZAN

  Former Deputy Speaker, Israeli Knesset

  1973: The Road to War is a blockbuster for anyone concerned about the tragic slaughter which flowed from surprise attacks by Egypt and Syria on Israel on Yom Kippur, the holiest day of the Jewish year. Refuting long widespread public understanding of the war’s origins as a colossal intelligence failure in both Tel Aviv and Washington, Yigal Kipnis produced this meticulously documented account of the pre-war diplomatic minuet between Cairo and Jerusalem, orchestrated and conducted by Henry Kissinger while Nixon retreated slowly toward his Watergate whirlpool.

  Kipnis reveals how even the closest conceivable American-Israeli diplomatic collaboration could not dent Golda Meir’s conviction that Israel would easily repulse any Egyptian attack, and that was preferable to any political concessions to Sadat’s importuning or Kissinger’s forebodings.

  This book is important on many levels for historians and for policymakers. It is a demonstration of the limits of American influence on Israel’s leaders, even when they enjoy maximum intimacy with the White House; a depressing look into the way Golda Meir held vital political/diplomatic information to a tiny circle, leaning entirely on Moshe Dayan and Yisrael Galili and excluding Yigal Allon, other key cabinet members, and her military and intelligence chiefs from her decision-making circle; confirmation that this bloodiest of Israel’s wars of self-defense was, in the words of Bill Quandt’s excellent introduction, an avoidable war; and as another example of how many years must elapse before historians can gain access to the secret documents needed to piece together the diplomatic prologue to war.

  Kipnis’s work is truly groundbreaking and an extraordinary achievement that, now finally available in English, merits a wide readership.

  —HON. SAMUEL W. LEWIS

  Former US Ambassador to Israel

  Former President, US Institute of Peace

  As one who fought in, studied, and published about the October 1973 war, I felt that nothing could surprise me any more about it. Yigal Kipnis has done that, however. While he confirmed some of my earlier assessments, he put others into question. His mining of the newly available documents made the road to October much more understandable. The 1973 war changed the Middle East, and Kipnis’s book helps us understand that change.

  —ABDEL MONEM SAID ALY

  Chairman and Director

  Regional Center for Strategic Studies, Cairo

  ABOUT

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  Just World Books produces excellent books on key international issues—and does so in a very timely fashion. All of our titles are published first as quality paperbacks. Most are later also released as e-books and some in hardcover. Because of the agility of our process, we cannot give detailed advance notice of fixed, seasonal “lists.”

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  Other works by

  Dr. Yigal Kipnis

  Ha-Har She-Haya Kemifletset: Ha-Golan Bayn Surya Ve-Yisrael

  [The Mountain that Was as a Monster:

  The Golan Heights Between Syria and Israel].

  Jerusalem: Magnes, 2009. Hebrew.

  1973: Ha-Derekh La-Milhamah [1973: The Road to War].

  Or Yehuda: Kinneret, Zmora-Bitan, Dvir, 2012. Hebrew.

  The
Golan Heights: Political History,

  Settlement and Geography since 1949.

  Oxford and New York: Routledge, 2013.

  Just World Books is an imprint of Just World Publishing, LLC.

  All text in this work except the Foreword © 2013 Yigal Kipnis.

  Foreword © 2013 William B. Quandt.

  Originally published in Hebrew as 1973: Ha-Derekh La-Milhamah.

  All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced or transmitted in any

  form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopy, recording, or

  any information storage retrieval system, without permission in writing from the

  publisher, except brief passages for review purposes. Visit our website,

  www.justworldbooks.com.

  Typesetting by Jane T. Sickon for Just World Publishing, LLC.

  Cartography and cover design by Lewis Rector for Just World Publishing, LLC.

  Publisher’s Cataloging-in-Publication

  (Provided by Quality Books, Inc.)

  Kipnis, Yigal.

  [1973 ha-derekh la-milhamah. English]

  1973: the road to war / Yigal Kipnis; translator,

  Barbara Doron; foreword by William B. Quandt.

  pages cm

  Includes bibliographical references.

  LCCN 2013945978

  ISBN (pb.): 978-1-935982-30-2

  ISBN (hc.): 978-1-935982-31-9

  ISBN (eBook): 978-1-935982-38-8

  1. Arab-Israeli conflict—1967-1973. 2. Israel-Arab

  War, 1973—Diplomatic history. I. Doron, Barbara,

  translator. II. Translation of: Kipnis, Yigal. 1973

  ha-derekh la-milhamah. III. Title.

  DS128.12.A1513 2013 956.04’8

  QBI13-600124

  Contents

  Foreword

  A Note on Sources

  Map

  Introduction

  1. In Israel—Fear of an American Initiative

  The Challenge of Sadat

  The Expulsion of Soviet Advisors

  The Egyptian Army Changes Strategy

  What Did Marwan Know?

  Meanwhile, in Israel

  “Let This Thing Go Away”

  Ismail Would Not Decide

  “How Am I Going to Fill Two Days with Him?”

  Philosophical Discussions

  The Public Meetings

  2. Four Days in February

  Sunday and Monday: Kissinger’s Talks with Ismail

  Tuesday, February 27, 1973, 11:42, Meeting between Kissinger and Hussein

  Tuesday, February 27, 1973, 15:30, Meeting between Kissinger and Rabin

  The “Understandings of December 1971”

  Wednesday, February 28, 1973, Morning, Meeting between Kissinger, Meir, and Rabin

  Wednesday, February 28, 1973, 19:30, Meeting between Kissinger and Rabin

  Thursday, March 1, 1973, 11:00, Meeting between Nixon and Meir at the White House

  3. From Armonk to Golda’s Kitchen—March–April 1973

  The First Steps: March 1973

  Meir Calms Her Ministers: “Nothing Will Be Done behind Our Backs”

  In Egypt: “We Will Wait for a Time to See What Results His Statement Will Bring”

  The Secret Channel—From Doing Business to Dragging Feet

  April: Military Tension Rising and Falling

  Operation “Spring of Youth” in Israel

  Meanwhile, in the Not-Secret-Enough Channel

  In Golda’s Kitchen: Going to War, Not to a Political Agreement

  4. To Paris and Back—May 1973

  The First Warning from Hussein—“From Time to Time ‘Charles’ Has a Tendency to Exaggerate”

  Egyptian Conduct: If They Threaten, They Don’t Fire

  The Meeting in Moscow—What Is Amusing Kissinger and Brezhnev?

  “Shaulson Will Be Disappointed”

  Kissinger’s Distress: “I Think We Ought to Waste Time So That There’s No Blowup”

  Kissinger and Ismail—Last Tango in Paris

  5. Dayan: Gentlemen, Please Prepare for War—June–August 1973

  On the Way to the Summit

  By the Wayside

  “Let Them Talk about Any Subject in the World Except Us”

  The Last Minute of the Summit: “Brezhnev Was Seized with an All-Consuming Desire to Discuss the Middle East”

  “We Came Out Well”

  “Who Would You Like to Be My Assistant for Middle Eastern Affairs?”

  Six Guests in the Officers’ Club in Alexandria

  6. Dayan’s Political Conception—September 1973

  “Terrorists Plotted to Bring Down an El Al Plane in Rome Using Russian Rockets”

  “What Is Moshe Dayan Cooking Up?”

  “The Americans Are Talking a Lot about the Need for Progress”

  A Three-Way Summit in Cairo

  September 13: Thirteen MiGs

  In Israel: “To Prepare the Army for a Period of Calm”

  Why Did They Advance the Zero Hour?

  “But We Were Going to Put Pressure on Them”

  “An Election Season Is Not a Convenient Time for Serious Discussion”

  7. Six Days Before the War—Who Was Responsible?

  Sunday, September 30: In Israel No One Is Talking and No One Is Telling Kissinger

  Monday, October 1: “The Arabs Talk and Talk”

  Tuesday, October 2: “Israel Will Be Acting Foolishly If It Rejects the Kissinger Plan”

  Wednesday, October 3: “To Share the Picture Rather Than to Make a Decision”

  Thursday, October 4: “This Month We Will Not Transform the World”

  Friday, October 5: “The Russians Know That the Egyptians and Syrians Are Going to Attack”

  8. Yisrael, What Do We Do Now?

  “The Entire IDF Should Not Be Mobilized Because of Zamir’s Stories”

  “Zvika’s Source Says That the War Can Be Avoided By an Information Leak”

  Planes Lacking a Political Captain

  Waking Kissinger: “We May Be in Trouble”

  “They’ll Be Sorry”

  Appendix: The Story of Ashraf Marwan and the Yom Kippur War

  For Whom Was Marwan Acting?

  Did Marwan Knowingly Deceive Israel?

  The False Warning Period

  Syria and Egypt Prepare for War

  The Last Days before the War

  Last-Day Question Marks

  To What Extent Did Marwan Affect Israeli Decision-Making?

  The Chief of Staff

  The Head of Military Intelligence

  The Head of the Mossad

  The Prime Minister

  The Defense Minister

  Who Revealed Ashraf Marwan’s Identity?

  Was the Timing of Marwan’s Death Coincidental?

  Dramatis Personae

  Timeline of Events

  Bibliography

  Acknowledgments

  Foreword

  William B. Quandt

  Professor Emeritus, University of Virginia

  Early on the morning of October 6, 1973, the phone rang in my apartment in southwest Washington, D.C. The 6:00 a.m. caller was a duty officer in the White House Situation Room. I had become acting head of the Middle East office at the National Security Council (NSC) the previous day and had left word that I should be called if there were any major developments in the tense Arab-Israeli arena.

  The previous day had been filled with alarming news of preparations for war, yet the Israelis, with a reputedly excellent intelligence service, seemed calm; my quick survey of American intelligence assessments had confirmed that view. These signs of war, I had been told, were just exercises. “We’re watching things closely, don’t worry,” was the bureaucratic answer I received when I asked why the Egyptians were evacuating patients from hospitals on the front lines and why alert levels had gone to unprecedented heights on the Egyptian side of the Suez Canal.

  As I picked up the phone, I wa
s pretty sure that the news would not be good. Sure enough, the caller said he had a flash cable from the US embassy in Tel Aviv, which he proceeded to read to me. Prime Minister Golda Meir had just met with US Ambassador Kenneth Keating and had started the conversation by saying, “We may be in trouble.” Several “totally reliable” sources had informed Israel that “Syria and Egypt were planning a coordinated attack against Israel today in the late afternoon.”1 The most important of those sources was Ashraf Marwan—about whose role Dr. Yigal Kipnis tells us a lot more in the material that follows. In fact, the war began shortly before 14:00 Israel time, 08:00 in Washington.

  I participated personally in many of the meetings that Henry Kissinger and top US policymakers held in the lead-up to October 6, and in most of them during the war itself. Later, I did a lot of research and writing of my own on these events. I was not expecting to learn much new about US policy during this period in a book by an Israeli scholar. After all, most of the American sources have been available for some time now; Kissinger has written at length about the crisis; and just last year the Nixon Presidential Library held a conference on the occasion of the declassification of several hundred additional documents from its archives.2 What more could one hope to learn?

  The answer is that the most sensitive aspects of Israeli policymaking and US-Israel relations did not come into the public domain until quite recently. Yigal Kipnis’s 1973: The Road to War, published in Hebrew in 2012 and now in English, is the first account that mines both the rich American archives and, crucially, the recently released documents from the Israeli war cabinet. What we see is an intimate account of how key Israeli decision-makers—especially Prime Minister Meir and her defense minister Moshe Dayan—saw the events leading up to the war. We can read their remarkable communications with Henry Kissinger.

  Although I worked on Kissinger’s NSC staff during this period, I understood that he handled the Israeli account as almost a private matter. The Israeli ambassadors in Washington—first Yitzhak Rabin and then Simcha Dinitz—had a direct line to his office, a privilege shared by only one other ambassador, Anatoli Dobrynin of the USSR. When Kissinger spoke on the phone with these individuals, he would sometimes record the conversations; those tapes have been transcribed and are available to researchers. But when Kissinger met face-to-face with Rabin or Dinitz, there was often no American record of what transpired. The Israeli ambassador, however, would report in detail to the prime minister, who would usually respond, often with revealing and detailed instructions. These are the resources that Kipnis has examined and on which he bases much of his analysis.